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IN THE SUPREME COURT
o.f the

STATE OF UTAH
BUDGET
tion,

HO~iES,

INC., a corpora-

Plaintiff,
vs.
STATE TAX

Case No.
7605

CO:\I~IIS.SION,

Defendant.

DEFENDANT'S. REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF·
IN ANSWER TO DEFENDANT'S. PETITION
FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT
This reply is filed pursuant to order of the Chief
Justice dated October 23, 1951. The Tax Commission
appreciates the opportunity of filing this reply in view
of the serious and important issue presented by this case.
The Commission is, of course, fully aware of the
difficulties involved in persuading the Court to rehear
a case. Ordinarily when a case is tried, appealed, briefed,
argued and decided, all aspects of the case have been
thoroughly explored by the c·ourt. In such circumstances
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a petition for rehearing travels a vvorn path. The fact,
however, that the rules do provide for a rehearing procedure is at least an indication that on some occasions,
however rare they may be, a miscarriage of justice may
occur. This case is such an occasion.
To justify the rehearing of a case, counsel should
be able to point to some decisive law applicable to the
issue of the case which was overlooked by the Court
and which, if considered, would lead the court to a
different result. This case is such an instance.
We make no reply herein to Plaintiff's charge of
inconsistency other than to state that far above any
duty on the part of Counsel to be consistent, if such
duty there be, is the duty to bring to the Court all of
the facts and all of the law necessary to enable the Court
to arrive at a correct decision of the case. Consistency
is not such a jewel as to prevent the suppression on
rehearing of the law applicable to the case where such
law was not previously considered by the Court.
Nor do we think it behooves any taxpaye-r, especially
one coming into Court so soaked and dripping with
illegality as this one, to imply that the Tax Commission
as judge, prosecutor and jury failed to give the taxpayer
a fair and impartial hearing. Any remarks or suggestions which c·ounsel may have for the improvement of
administrative procedures in the State of Utah should,
we think, be directed to the appropriate authorities independently and not as an argument in this case.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
The Commission's petition for rehearing here rests
on the ground that Budget Homes, Inc. "\Vas not liquidated or dissolved in la."\v and therefore continued in
business in fact.
e argue that the Court in its opinion
by assuming that the assets of Budget Homes, Inc. were
distributed to the stockholders in a genuine and bona
fide liquidation, assumed the very point in issue in the
case. We argue that by the wholesale violation of the
Utah Statutes relating to the liquidation and dissolution
of Utah corporations, the so-called liquidation of
Budget Homes, Inc. "\Vas illegal, abortive and of no effect.
We argue that in violating the corporation laws, the
penal code and the public policy of the State of Utah,
Budget Homes, Inc. and its four shareholders have by
their illega1ity forfeited those tax benefits which are
reserved for those who comply with our statutes. We
argue that the Tax Commission and this Court cannot
recognize as valid for tax purposes that which is in clear
and admitted violation of the civil and penal code of this
state. We argue that an illegal transaction is a sham
transaction.
How does Plaintiff meet this argument~ As "\Ve
read his brief, he argues that all of the provisions in
the Utah Statutes covering the lawful liquidation and
distribution of the assets of a Utah corporation are mere
formalisms, that they are designed for the protection of
those who might be prejudiced-"stockholders, creditors,
or even tax authorities where a tax is actually owing"-,
that the Tax Commission has not been prejudiced and
has no right to complain as a creditor in this case because

'V
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by the Court's own opinion it is now adjudged that no
tax is owing by the corporation.
We cannot help but express our concern at such
an infirm, shallow and feeble argument which, in essence,
asserts that the state has no right to complain because
there is no tax owing and then asserts that there is no
tax owing because the state has no right to complain.
Not until this Court's decision has become final will it
have been adjudged no tax is owing. The Court's present
opinion, unless changed, will be difficult enough as a
precedent in the future without having it cited against
us at this stage while we are all struggling to help the
Court determine whether or not it is correct.
POINT I
THE UTAH STATUTES RELATING TO THE LIQUIDATION AND DISSOLUTION OF UTAH CORPORATIONS
WERE SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED FOR THE PROTECTION
OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, AMONG
OTHERS, AND THE COMMISSION HAS A RIGHT TO COMPLAIN HERE OF THEIR VIOLATION.

Under Section 18-2-17, the capital of a corporation
cannot be paid over to the stockholders "except as provided by law." The legal requirements for such withdrawal are six in number, namely:
(1) Payment of the corporation's debt and taxes
or the making of adequate provision therefor.
(2) Approval of the plan of liquidation and dissolution by a two-third vote of the stockholders.
( 3) Prior to distribution of the assets, depositing
with the State Tax Commission and with the S.ecretary
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of State an affidavit that all debts and taxes have been
paid or provided for.
Prior to distribution of the assets, depositing
with the State Tax Conunission and with the Secretary
of State a verified copy of the resolution by the shareholders authorizing the liquidation.
(5) Prior to distribution of the assets, depositing
with the State Tax Commission and with the Secreta.ry
of State an affidavit that a copy of the liquidation resolution was mailed to every non-participating shareholder.
(6) Prior to distribution of the assets, depositing
with the State Tax Commission and with the Secretary
of State proof that notice was published once a week for
three consecutive weeks in a newspaper to inform the
public it was ceasing to do business as a corporation
and giving the dates on which distribution of assets
would be made.
( ±)

Also, Section 103-12-4 of the Penal Code provides
in part as follows :
"Every director of any stock corporation who
concurs in any vote or act of the directors of
such corporation or any of them by which it is
intended either :
(2) To divide, withdraw or in any manner,
except as provided by law, pay to the stockholders, or any of them, any part of the capital
of the corporation; * * * ; - is guilty of a misdemeanor."
We have pTeyiously pointed out that Plaintiff flagrantly violated the above provisions. Of the six requireSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ments, only. one was met, namely, the approval of the
stockholders to the plan of liquidation. The other five
requirements were admittedly violated. Plaintiff's approach has been to discuss each violation separately and
dismiss it because it is such a small thing. We are not
here faced, however, with a case of substantial compliance. We are faced with the wholesale violation of
statutes de-signed expressly and specifically for the protection and benefit of the State Tax Commission.
When the statute states that the capital assets cannot be withdrawn from the corporation except where the
necessary affidavits and proofs have been deposited
with the State Tax Commission prior to the distribution
of the assets, we think it is pretty obvious that this statute was designed for the protection of the State Tax
Commission. It is not a statute designed solely for the
protection of stockholders and creditors. Therefore,
when Plaintiff in black-faced type asks "Just whom
then is the Commission looking after~", the reply is
obvious.
What can the meaning and the legislative intent of
these requirements be if not to permit the State Tax
Com~ission to ignore for tax purposes those abortive
transactions which plainly violate the clear terms of the
statute~ Is violation of the statute to be given the same
effect as compliance~ Does illegality merit such high
reward~

Just as Plaintiff concedes that minority stockhoJders
or creditors can make the stockholders "put it back",
so also under this statute can the Tax Commission
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make the stockholders "put it back" for tax purposes.
When the statute requires notice to the State Tax Commission, it is prejudiced and seriously prejudiced when
this notice is not given. The Tax Commission has several thousand domestic and foreign corporations on its
corporation franchise tax rolls. How can it possibly audit
these returns and determine tax liabilities if it cannot
follow and rely on the status of the corporations as
they appear on the records of the state as required by
the statutes~
Plaintiff's argument that the Tax Commission has
no right to complain because there is no tax actually
owing begs the question. It overlooks the fact that the
point involved here is one of status, the status of Budget
Homes, Inc. as a corporation. It was given corporate
status by the law and this status cannot be dissolved
except by law. To argue that the several things which
give and take away that status are little things-"pure
formalism"-is unsound.
A marriage license and indeed the marriage ceremony itself may be regarded, under this view, as small
things-"pure formalism"-but they are essential. A
divorce decree is, after all, only a piece of paper but
it is mandatory. An adoption proceeding may be regarded as a mere legal ritual, the: ap·pointment of a guardian
as a lot of legal mumbo-jumbo, but in all these matters
of status the law, as we understand it, is quite careful to
surround both the creation and dissolution of the status
with certain legal requirements and safeguards. These
requirements are not "pure fomalism," they are essential
to such status. Individuals acquire corporate status by
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statute and cannot terminate such status except by statute.
It is true in this case that Prudential, a very large
creditor, has not complained. There was no need for it
to complain. The abortive liquidation which took place
here was so illegal that insofar as Prudential was concerned it could be completely ignored. Under the statute,
the debts of Budget Homes, Inc. to Prudential should
have been paid prior to the distribution of the assets
repeat prior to the distribution of the assets. They were
not. The corporation continued personally liable for
its debts to Prudential. Prudential's rights on the mortgaged assets continued unimpaired, its rights as creditor
against the unmortgaged assets were in no way disturbed.
vVe suggest that what Prudential did or did not do,
what it may or may not have done, does not affect in
the slightest the right of the Tax Commission to look
after its interests.
Plaintiff emphasizes (p. 5, 9, 10) the provision (Sec.
18-2-17.11) which requires the suit for dissolution to be
filed in court within 90 days from distribution except
where "sufficient reason" appears. He argues that installation of the meter boxes and doing nece·ssary road
work constitutes sufficient reason for the time lag in
this case between resolution date and filing of the suit
in court and that in any event this is a matter for the
District c·ourt to determine, not the Tax Commission.
It is a pleasure to agree with at least one of Plaintiff's
arguments. Unfortunately, however, this argument is
beside the· point. We are arguing that the Tax Commission cannot accept the legitimacy of the liquidation in
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this case, not because of the delay between resolution
date and filing of the dissolution suit (Sec. 18-2-17.11),
but because under Sec. 18-2-17, another section, assets
cannot be distributed to shareholders in advance of a
court decree unless prior to the distribution of the assets
repeat prior to the distribution of the assets, the necessary affidavits and notices are filed with the State Tax
Commission.
Plaintiff makes a point (p. 9) also of the fact that
the dissolution provisions a.re in the chapter on corporations and are not revenue 1neasures because not contained in the chapter relating to taxation. This point,
although unsound, ~erits some discussion. Actually,
these provisions are partly in the corporation law, (Sec.
18-2-17 et seq.), partly in the Judicial Code (Sec. 10442-1 et seq.) under "Voluntary Dissolution of Corporations,'' and partly in the Penal Code (Sec. 103-12-4).
However, we concede they are not in the chapter on
taxation. At the same time·, we do not concede that they
have nothing to do with taxation. Obviously they do.
The State Tax Commission is specifically mentioned
in Sec. 18-2-17. Assets cannot there be distributed to
shareholders unless prior to the distribution of the assets
repeat prior to the distribution of the assets certain
affidavits and notices are filed with the State Tax Commission, including an affidavit that all known debts and
taxes have been paid or pro~ded for. The Corporation
Franchise Tax Section of the Auditing Division carries
on a considerable amount of its activity under this section of the corporation law. This section in turn is tied
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in with the criminal provision (Sec; 103-12-4) which
excepts those withdrawals by shareholders which are
"pr·ovided by law." s.ection 104-42-6 of the Judicial
Code also has a lot to do with a corporation's tax liability. It contains provisions relating to the tax certificate from the State Tax Commission before dissolution
by the court. More importantly, however, it provides:

"The tax liability of the corporation shall
be determined as of the date the corporation
formally resolved in a proper resolution to quit
doing business as a corporation, provided, however, that if a corporation does business other
than in the normal course of liquidation, and
winding-up its affairs, after the date determined
in said resolution, the tax liability of said corporation shall be fixed as of the date the corporation actually ceased doing business."
It is this important provision, on final analysis, in
relation with its companion provisions in the corporation franchise tax law, the corporation law and the penal
code, which must be construed by this Court to decide
this case. Plaintiff's suggestion that the above provision
is not in the taxation chapter and, therefore, has nothing
to do with taxation is clearly absurd. Although it. would
be highly desirable if the legislature put all provisions
relating to taxation in the chapter on taxation, the Tax
Commission cannot avoid its duty to administer the
state's tax laws wherever they may be found.
For example, there is nothing in the Inheritance
Tax Law authorizing the Tax Commission to release
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inheritance tax liens. Fortunately, however, placed
in an obscure corner of the Judicial c·ode under the
heading "Termination of Life Estate" (Sec. 104-41-1)
is such authority. Are the many releases issued over
the years by the Commission invalid for this reason~
The Court cannot, therefore, avoid a consideration
of the above quoted provision in the Judicial C.ode which
determines ".,.hen and how the tax liability of a corporation in liquidation and dissolution is cut off.
..~..t\..gain, we say it sets forth in effeet three simple
rules:
(1) If the corporation does not liquidate
according to law, it continues so far as the State
Tax Commission is concerned until it is liquidated
according to lR\V.
(2) If it liquidates lawfully, its tax liability
is determined as of the resolution date, provided
its activities thereafter are confined to windingup its affairs.
(3) If it liquidates lawfully but continues
to do business after the resolution date., its tax
liability is determined as of the date it actually
ceases to do business.
(a) If the post-resolution business is production only with no selling, tax is computed
on either the minimum or property basis,
whichever is higher.
(b) If the post-resolution business is production and selling, tax is computed on either
the minimum, property or income basis,
whichever is highe·r.
We think the present case can only fit under sub-
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division (1) above. Plaintiff's Reply Brief contains a
lot of remarks about the crown jewels of Utah, the splendid virtues of consistency, the fact that the Commission
is judge, prosecutor, jury, etc., but we have so far been
unable to penetrate· these various remarks deep enough
to determine in which category Plaintiff thinks his case
falls.
Plaintiff can hardly contend it falls under (2) above
so as to completely cut off the tax liability as of October
31, 1947 because by its own tax returns filed for the
years 1948 and 1949 it continued as a corporation doing
business in Utah after that date. Furthermore, it continued by the evidence in this case to exercise its corporate powers by installing meters, constructing a road
and showing up in person at each closing transaction
of each sale· of each house to sign the substitution agreement with Prudential under which the debt owing by
Budget Homes, Inc. was taken over hy the purchaser.
If, by some stretch of the imagination, this post-resolution activity is regarded as winding-up activity only,
the taxes voluntarily paid with its returns for 1948
and 1949 were collected in error. On the other hand, if
this post-resolution activity is something more than
winding-up activity and assuming the lawfulness of the
liquidation, the question then would be, does the case
fit under 3 (a) or 3 (h)~
In its most favorable light, Plaintiff's strongest case
would be an attempt to fit under 3 (a). A somewhat
plausible case could perhaps be built up. along this line.
The difficulty of Plaintiff's position in this regard, how-
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ever, is that it con1pletely overlooks the requirement of
the statute that to distribute the assets to the stockholders the corporation must file the necessary affidavits
and notices 'vith the Tax Commission prior to the distribution of the assets repeat prior to the distribution
of the assets, 'vhich requirement was clearly intended
for the benefit and protection of the Tax Commission.
However, if the Court construes this requirement as
requiring the Commission to get the directors of Budget
Homes, Inc. thrown into jail under Sec. 103-12-4 of the
Penal Code to secure compliance with the provisions
of Sec. 18-2-17, and as not authorizing the c·ommission
to ignore the so-called liquidation when Sec. 18-2-17 has
been clearly violated (which, of course, would destroy
category (1) above), Plaintiff is then faced with the
difficulty of fitting in 3 (b) rather than 3 (a) because
of its participation in each sale of each house at each
closing transaction.
Plaintiff's remarks on page 7 completely gloss o¥er
the fact that at each sale of each house at each closing
transaction, the President of Budget Homes, Inc. showed
up in person on behalf of Budget Homes, Inc. and joined
in an agreement with Prudential and the purchaser,
together with the stockhoJders. Here, acting under
its corporate· powers and in consideration of various
promises, waivers and representations, Prudential released the debt of Budget Homes, Inc. on that particular
house, it being in the agreement assumed by the purchaser. What more active participation by Budget
Homes, Inc. in the sales is necessary to put it in 3 (b)
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above~

The individual sales could not be made by the
stockholders of Budget Homes, Inc. without the participation of Budget Homes, Inc. in the sale. The financing
of a sale is an integral part of a sale. Budget Homes,
Inc. in signing the substitution agreement in effect transferred its financing arrangements with Prudential to the
purchaser. The purchaser stepped into the boots of
Budget Homes, Inc. We ask the Court to take another
look at the substitution agreement appearing at pages
81-82 of the Record. Subdivision (1) above fits this case,
but if it doesn't 3 (b) must. In either (2) or 3 (a) Budget
Homes, Inc. would be a square peg in a round hole.
In the Pace Case, 91 Utah 132 (1936), the Court in
considering Sec. 103-12-4 in another connection stated
(p.137):
"It would seem that the implication from
sub-division 2, 103-12-4, which 1nakes it a misdemeanor for a director to concur in any vote
by which it is intended to pay to a stockholder
any portion of the capital was that it would be
against public policy to do the very thing which
makes it a crime for such director to concur in."
To decide this case in Plaintiff's favor the Court
must hold that Sec. 18-2-17 has criminal but no civil
sanction and that the participation of Budget Homes,
Inc. in each sale of each house at each closing transaction was a mere nothing at all. If the Court meets these
issues and decides that Plaintiff should still prevail,
Plaintiff will find the Commission to be a good loser.
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CONCLUSION
This case is an important case from the standpoint
of the need of the Commission and the corporate taxpayers of the state for guidance in determining when
and how state tax liabilities are to be terminated in
liquidation and dissolution proceedings. The statute as
we interpret it is both fair and workable from the administrative standpoint. It seen1s little enough to ask the
men1bers of the Bar of this state to follow the statute
and, to insure compliance, to continue assessing the
franchise tax against the corporation until the statute
is followed. The tax itself is small while the corporate
privileges granted by the state are great. The Court's
present opinion gives the Commission very little light
on a difficult administrative problem because it doesn't
consider the problem. The effect of the· decision is to
condone the most flagrant violation of our statutes which
were clearly intended to give some measure of protection to the Tax c·ommission in the discharge: of its duties.
The case, unfortunately, seems to have been regarded by the Court as a tax avoidance problem. FTom
the state's standpoint, this is not so. We attack the
transaction simply by virtue of the wholesale and flagrant violation of the state statutes which set forth an
orderly and sensible procedure for the liquidation and
dissolution of Utah corporations. Whether or not by
winning the case, the state would get additional tax from
these taxpayers is very doubtful. On the face of it, we
are caught in the position of attempting to collect a 3%
tax from the corporation when presumably 5% tax has
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already been paid by the stockhoJders. Whether or not
after putting the income back, the Commission should
permit some portion to be treated as salary withdrawal
(deductible) or dividend withdrawal (non-deductible)
remains to be seen. Of if the stockholders actually put
the money back and file claims for refund of their individual tax they may want to keep it in the corporation.
It is impossible to say. In any event, it should be obvious
that the case is not a tax avoidance problem so far as the
state is concerned.
On the other hand, it is equally clear that the case
does involve the avoidance of Federal taxes. Federal
income taxes are now at such high levels on both corpoTations and individuals that the use of collapsible corporations has become quite widespread. By use of this
device the corporation tax is avoided because the corporation does not sell and the gain to the stockholders
who do sell is not taxed as ordinary income but is treated
as capital gain arising from liquidation of the corporation's assets. The Bureau of Internal Revenue has attempted to meet this problem by suits under the Court
Holding Company doctrine and recent legislation by
Congress attempts also to deal with the problem.
If Budget Homes, Inc. and its stockholders think
they can reduce their Federal taxes legally in the Utah
courts, that is their prerogative. Let us be sure, ho,vever, that when the decision of the highest court of Utah
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sets sail into the Federal courts to engage in the
battle of collapsible corporations, the decision is
seaworthy enough to stand the strain.
Respectfully submitted,

C. M. GILMOUR,
DON J. HANSON,
LELAND S. McCULLOUGH,
Attorneys for Defendant.
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